The Incompatibility of Due Process and Naked Statistical Evidence by Nunn, G. Alexander
Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 68 | Issue 5 Article 6
10-2015
The Incompatibility of Due Process and Naked
Statistical Evidence
G. Alexander Nunn
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an
authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
G. Alexander Nunn, The Incompatibility of Due Process and Naked Statistical Evidence, 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 1407 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol68/iss5/6
The Incompatibility of Due Process
and Naked Statistical Evidence
I. INTRODUCTION ................................ ....... 1407
II. RESOLVING THE GATECRASHER'S PARADOX:
AN OPEN QUESTION .................................. 1411
A. Discounting Naked Statistical Evidence............... 1411
B. Creating a New Rule of Evidence ...... ....... 1413
C. Addressing the Burden of Proof... .......... 1415
D. The New Perspective..................... 1417
III. FACTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY AND DUE PROCESS ............. 1417
A. Mutually Exclusive Verdicts................. 1418
B. Constitutional Concerns .............. ...... 1421
IV. THE GATECRASHER'S PARADOX UNDER THE
LENS OF DUE PROCESS ........................ ........ 1423
A. A New Perspective on an Old Problem .... ..... 1424
B. Improbability and Impossibility......... ...... 1425
C. Core Inconsistencies ................. ...... 1426
V. THE RANGE OF THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE ... ......... 1428
A. The Prison Guard Hypothetical:
Where to Draw the Line? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1428
B. The Blue Bus Problem: Highlighting the
Contours of the Due Process Defense ..... ..... 1431
VI. CONCLUSION .............................. ....... 1433
I. INTRODUCTION
Qualitative evidence is a cornerstone of the modern trial system.
Parties often invoke eyewitness testimony, character witnesses, or
other forms of direct and circumstantial evidence when seeking to
advance their case in the courtroom, enabling jurors to reach a verdict
after weighing two competing narratives.' But what if testimonial,
experience-based evidence were removed from trials? In a legal system
that draws its legitimacy from centuries of tradition-emphasizing
1. See Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 148 (1997)
(recognizing this phenomenon).
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notions of fairness even above absolute accuracy2-Would a jury, not to
mention the public at large, reject a verdict that imposes liability or
guilt on a defendant in the complete absence of qualitative evidence?
More specifically, does a judgment that rests solely on probabilities or
other quantitative evidence offend deep-rooted notions of fairness,
especially when that quantitative evidence fails to establish a coherent
narrative for the plaintiffs case as a whole? In at least one situation,
the answer appears to be yes.
L. Jonathan Cohen's notorious Gatecrasher's Paradox presents
a novel problem that spawns from solely using probabilistic evidence
(or "naked statistical evidence") to impose liability.3 Cohen presents his
hypothetical as follows:
Consider, for example, a case in which it is common ground that 499 people paid for
admission to a rodeo, and that 1,000 are counted on the seats, of whom A is one. Suppose
no tickets were issued and there can be no testimony as to whether A paid for admission
or climbed over the fence. So by any plausible criterion of mathematical probability there
is a .501 probability, on the admitted facts, that he did not pay. The mathematicist theory
would apparently imply that in such circumstances the rodeo organizers are entitled to
judgement against A for the admission-money, since the balance of probability (and also
the difference between prior and posterior probabilities) would lie in their favour. But it
seems manifestly unjust that A should lose his case when there is an agreed mathematical
probability of as high as .499 that he in fact paid for admission.
Indeed, if the organizers were really entitled to judgement against A, they would
presumably be equally entitled to judgement against each person in the same situation
as A. So they might conceivably be entitled to recover 1,000 admission-moneys, when it
was admitted that 499 had actually been paid. The absurd injustice of this suffices to
show that there is something wrong somewhere. But where?4
Since its proposal, numerous articles and commentaries have grappled
with the Gatecrasher's Paradox, seeking to remedy an undeniable
feeling of injustice that comes from wrestling with the problem.5 While,
2. E.g., Mirjan Damaska, Truth in Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289, 301 (1998) ("Quite
obviously, however, truth-conducive values cannot be an overriding consideration in legal
proceedings: it is generally recognized that several social needs and values exercise a constraining
effect on attempts to achieve fact-finding precision.").
3. L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 74-75 (1977).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254,
1269-71 (2013) (evaluating the Gatecrasher's Paradox under a reconceptualized burden of proof);
Richard Eggleston, The Probability Debate, 1980 CRIM. L. REV. 678, 678 (1980) (defending the
plaintiff in the Gatecrasher's Paradox); Stephen E. Fienberg, Gatecrashers, Blue Buses, and the
Bayesian Representation of Legal Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 693, 693-98 (1986) (discussing the
Gatecrasher's Paradox in conjunction with the Blue Bus problem); David Kaye, The Laws of
Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 36-39 (1979) (discounting the statistical
evidence at play in the Gatecrasher's Paradox); Glanville Williams, The Mathematics of Proof-I,
1979 CRIM. L. REV. 297, 297-301 (resolving the paradox by proposing an additional legal rule
which would require that evidence be tailored to a single defendant, rather than allowing evidence
to remain applicable to an entire population of possible defendants).
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from a purely quantitative standpoint, the weight of the evidence
supports the imposition of liability on each rodeo attendee, the sole use
of probabilities to assess this liability seems innately unfair. This
tension has spawned a great debate, a debate that does not merely seek
to solve Cohen's academic puzzle, but more deeply questions the role of
naked statistical evidence in today's legal system.6
Contributing to this discourse, this Note argues that in certain
circumstances-such as the situation presented in the Gatecrasher's
Paradox-the use of naked statistical evidence constitutes a due
process violation. United States circuit courts have held that the use of
"inherently factually contradictory theories violates the principles of
due process."7 In other words, a due process violation occurs when a
prosecutor advances irreconcilable theories for a case against multiple
defendants in an attempt to simultaneously secure mutually exclusive
verdicts for a single, "lone gunman" crime.8 The absolute certainty that
the prosecutor has presented a false impression in at least one of these
trials renders each trial fundamentally unfair.9
These due process concerns are equally in play in the
Gatecrasher's Paradox. Once the 502nd defendant has been found liable
for trespass, there is a certainty that at least one innocent rodeo
attendee has been found liable.10 Thus, the Gatecrasher plaintiff must
have advanced a false impression in at least one trial: the plaintiff
presented naked statistical evidence to argue that 502 defendants were
more-likely-than-not gatecrashers despite knowing that the evidence
did not back his claim at least once. The plaintiffs continued ability to
advance this theory in the face of factual impossibility renders each
6. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Generalized Inferences, Individual Merits, and Jury
Discretion, 66 B.U. L. REV. 509, 509 (1986) ("MVuch of the debate in current evidence scholarship
concerns the appropriateness of using standard probability theory in modeling adjudicative
factfinding. In that debate, the question of whether a verdict can be supported by 'naked statistical
evidence' has been accorded great importance.").
7. See Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a due process violation
where a prosecutor uses a factually impossible theory for the case to secure mutually exclusive
verdicts); 5 WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 38:34 (2d ed.) ("Some courts have held that the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause prevents prosecutors from using different theories of the same
facts in order to convict multiple defendants allegedly involved in the same crime. However, the
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue."). But see Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187-
88 (2005) (noting that factually inconsistent theories for immaterial issues do not raise due process
concerns, but remanding to determine whether a factual inconsistency at the core of a prosecutor's
theory violates the Due Process Clause); Stumpfv. Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 754 (6th Cir. 2013) (en
banc) (finding no due process violation when prosecutors are merely drawing two separate
inferences from the same evidentiary record).
8. See, e.g., Smith, 205 F.3d at 1052.
9. Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the
Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1460 (2001).
10. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
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subsequent trial fundamentally unfair and in violation of the Due
Process Clause."
But does this response provide a complete answer? Should the
first 501 defendants merely bemoan their luck as members of the class
sued within the realm of the factually possible while the 502nd
defendant and his subsequent companions cheer the availability of
their newly acquired due process defense? The answer must be no,
especially considering that the evidence advanced against the first 501
defendants-the 50.1% chance that each of them is indeed a
trespasser-is identical to the evidence that would be presented against
the remaining rodeo attendees. Thus, this Note argues that due process
violations take a second form, a form unique to naked statistical
evidence: if the same naked statistical evidence could be used to impose
liability on any randomly selected member of a population, and the
subsequent imposition of liability on the entire population would
constitute a due process violation because of factual impossibility, then
imposing liability on even one defendant constitutes a due process
violation. Such a rule directly targets the mechanics of the
Gatecrasher's Paradox, and prevents the Gatecrasher plaintiff from
recovering against any of the defendants in the absence of additional
evidence.
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II of this Note examines
historical responses to Cohen's paradox, detailing the various
approaches and legal doctrines that commentators have grappled with
when seeking to resolve the time-honored problem. Additionally, Part
II presents the current state of the discussion surrounding the
Gatecrasher's Paradox and the persisting interest in the open question.
Part III delves into constitutional analysis, detailing the due
process concerns that arise when factually inconsistent theories are
advanced to secure mutually exclusive verdicts. Moreover, Part III
argues that this analysis, which has historically been used in the
criminal context, is equally applicable to civil proceedings and the
Gatecrasher's Paradox.
Part IV offers a novel solution to the Gatecrasher's Paradox: the
plaintiffs sole employment of naked statistical evidence violates due
process; the hypothetical's potential for mutually exclusive, factually
impossible verdicts renders even one trial fundamentally unfair.
Part V then examines the contours and scope of the due process
defense. Using Charles Nesson's Prison Riot hypothetical, this Note
11. The Due Process clause requires that every trial be fundamentally fair. Neb. Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Cf. Smith, 205 F.3d at 1052 ("[The
use of inherently factually contradictory theories violates the principles of due process.").
[Vol. 68:5:14071410
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highlights the limit of this defense, noting that as a defendant's
likelihood of guilt rises, the viability of the due process defense
diminishes in step. Additionally, Part V examines the Blue Bus
Problem to delineate the type of naked statistical evidence susceptible
to the due process defense espoused by this Note.
Finally, Part VI concludes.
II. RESOLVING THE GATECRASHER'S PARADOx: AN OPEN QUESTION
Since Cohen's proposal of the Gatecrasher's Paradox in 1977,
numerous commentators have attempted to define and resolve the
uncomfortable feeling of injustice fostered by the hypothetical. 12
Despite the Gatecrasher plaintiffs apparent ability to satisfy his
burden of proof and thus hold any of the potential defendants liable, the
sole use of statistics to accomplish this task leaves a bitter taste for
many readers.1 3 This Part details some of the most common and
persuasive responses to the Gatecrasher's Paradox. While each of the
rebuttals below has merit, none has yet been universally accepted. 14 In
addition, and more importantly, no response has analyzed the
constitutional concerns that underlie the hypothetical. As such, the
Gatecrasher's Paradox remains an open question, for which this Note
offers a new perspective.15
A. Discounting Naked Statistical Evidence
Many responses to the Gatecrasher's Paradox attack the heart
of the problem, questioning the accuracy of the plaintiffs naked
statistical evidence and discounting the probative value of the same.16
12. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 5, at 1269-71 (evaluating the Gatecrasher's Paradox under
a reconceptualized burden of proof); Eggleston, supra note 5, at 678 (defending the plaintiff in the
Gatecrasher's Paradox); Fienberg, supra note 5, at 693-98 (discussing the Gatecrasher's Paradox
in conjunction with the Blue Bus problem); Kaye, supra note 5, at 36-39 (discounting the statistical
evidence at play in the Gatecrasher's Paradox); Williams, supra note 5, at 297-301 (resolving the
paradox by proposing an additional legal rule which would require that evidence be tailored to a
single defendant, rather than allowing evidence to remain applicable to an entire population of
possible defendants).
13. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. L. REV.
673, 674-77 (1986) (testing the compatibility of the Gatecrasher's Paradox with Bayesian logic).
14. Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect
Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 395 (1985) ("Scholarly debate has [ultimately] failed to produce
any satisfactory responses.").
15. See infra Part IV (solving the Gatecrasher's Paradox using the Due Process Clause).
16. See David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J.




Professor David Kaye's response to the Gatecrasher's Paradox is one of
the most prominent articles on naked statistical evidence and Cohen's
hypothetical.17 In general, Kaye seems to approach the Gatecrasher's
Paradox with a distinct goal: to decrease errors and improve accuracy
at trial.' 8 His analysis not only delves into the statistical underpinnings
of the problem, but also emphasizes the interplay between
administrability and justice.19
Kaye begins his critical analysis of the naked statistical evidence
in the Gatecrasher's Paradox by highlighting a discrepancy between
"objective probability" and "subjective probability." 20 While, objectively,
each rodeo attendee has a 50.1% likelihood of membership in the class
of trespassers, strict reliance on this quantitative evidence threatens to
oversimplify trials by replacing a trial's traditional narrative format
with mere background statistics. In this exchange, accuracy decreases
as the probative force of corresponding qualitative evidence is lost.
Thus, it may be appropriate to instead focus on what Kaye deems
subjective probability. As the label suggests, subjective probabilities
blend quantitative evidence with a desire for corresponding qualitative
support. A court calculating subjective probabilities might use objective
probabilities as a starting point, but later discount the same "simply to
create an incentive for plaintiffs to do more than establish the
background statistics."21 Thus, in the Gatecrasher's Paradox, the 50.1%
objective probability that any given defendant is a trespasser might be
unilaterally discounted by a court seeking corresponding qualitative
evidence. If this rationale and technique holds, the injustice evoked by
the hypothetical is waylaid as the plaintiff would need more than mere
statistics to overcome the preponderance standard. 22
Kaye's second, related response is more functional in nature.23
Put simply, the 50.1% chance that any one of the thousand rodeo
attendees is actually a gatecrasher is an overstatement. 24 Importantly,
17. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 401, 411-
14 (1986) (detailing the discourse between professors Kaye and Cohen over the Gatecrasher's
Paradox); David Kaye, Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof A Response to
Dr. Cohen's Reply, 1981 Aiz. ST. L.J. 635, 645 (1981) (responding to Jonathan Cohen's critique of
Kaye's earlier solution to the Gatecrasher's Paradox); Kaye, supra note 16, at 101-05.
18. Kaye, supra note 16, at 102-08; see also Allen, supra note 17, at 412.
19. Kaye, supra note 16, at 102-08; see also Allen, supra note 17, at 411-12.
20. Kaye, supra note 16, at 105-08; see also Allen, supra note 17, at 411-12.
21. Kaye, supra note 16, at 106 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Allen, supra note
17, at 411-12.
22. Kaye, supra note 16, at 102-08.
23. Id. at 107-08; see also Allen, supra note 17, at 412-13.
24. Kaye, supra note 16, at 106-08; see also Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 675 ("The problem
is that the evidence in question does not deal with each defendant's guilt individually.").
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the probability fails to account for the possibility that other applicable
evidence signaling a particular defendant's innocence exists but has
been withheld. 25 "Hence, if it is even slightly more likely that the rodeo
organizers would have been able to come forward with more evidence
about how the defendant A came onto the premises without paying if
he had actually done so," the 50.1% chance that defendant A is a
gatecrasher is an inflated mischaracterization. 26 Thus, Kaye argues
that a rational juror could reasonably believe the possibility that,
despite the naked statistical evidence against the Gatecrasher
defendants, external factors-such as withheld evidence of a particular
defendant's innocence-decrease the probability of that defendant's
guilt to a figure below one-half.27 In such a situation, "[aiccuracy is
increased . . . because the true probability is less than one-half, and
recovery is properly denied."28
Taken together, Kaye's responses ultimately propose an
overarching solution: naked statistical evidence should be discounted. 29
Both elements of the proposed solution seek to adjust the objective
probability that a given defendant is a gatecrasher by either
highlighting the need to create beneficial incentives or by arguing that
the probability is overstated given the possibility of other absent
evidence.
B. Creating a New Rule of Evidence
Departing from the statistical approach to the Gatecrasher's
Paradox, other commentators have sought to resolve Cohen's
conundrum through more normative proposals.30 For example,
Glanville Williams approaches the Gatecrasher's Paradox in a manner
wholly independent of probabilistic reasoning by primarily focusing on
an individual's sense of justice. 31 Williams argues that a plaintiff should
not prevail without first tying evidence to a specific defendant. 32 His
25. Kaye, supra note 16, at 106-08; see also Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 679-80.
26. Kaye, supra note 16, at 108.
27. Id.
28. Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 679-80.
29. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 45-56 (detailing different avenues whereby the apparent
50.1% chance of guilt can be seen as inaccurate).
30. See Williams, supra note 5, at 300 (solving the Gatecrasher's Paradox by proposing a new
rule of evidence).
31. Id.
32. Williams, supra note 5, at 297; see also Cohen, supra note 14, at 396 ("Glanville Williams
has suggested that the defendant must win in the rodeo example because, in addition to the
probabilistic burden, our sense of justice dictates that the plaintiff should not win if he does not
present some evidence specifically tying this particular defendant to the act in question."). Other
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proposed rule prevents a plaintiff from choosing a random individual
out of a population of potential defendants-as is the case in Cohen's
Gatecrasher's Paradox-and instead requires evidence tailored
specifically to the defendant on the stand. 33 Stated differently, the use
of naked statistical evidence should be unallowable as a sword for
plaintiffs, instead forcing a plaintiff to work with a population size of
one: the defendant in the instant case. 34
In the absence of his proposed rule, Williams also argues that
the injustice created by Cohen's hypothetical could be eliminated
through an apportionment system whereby damages are awarded not
solely based on the defendant's proportionate fault, but instead in
proportion to that defendant's "fault-plus-probability." 35 Such a system
of damage apportionment would reflect the disconcerting link between
the defendant and the naked statistical evidence used against him at
trial. Additionally, it would diminish the award to a plaintiff who relied
solely on naked statistical evidence, incentivizing the production of
additional evidence.36
Conversely, Sir Richard Eggleston took exception to this latter
proposition. 37 Eggleston, who also analyzed the Gatecrasher's Paradox
under a justice-based lens, instead argues that "any injustice involved
in giving judgment against the defendant in the rodeo case does not
outweigh the injustice of refusing a remedy to the plaintiff who has the
odds in his favor." 38 Rather than focusing on waylaying potential
injustice for defendants by decreasing judgments against them,
Eggleston focuses on the countervailing justice concern. Any
apportionment scheme in favor of the defendants will necessarily
detract from the recovery of the plaintiff, whose case has a higher
probability of accuracy. 39 Contrary to Williams's view, Eggleston finds
no injustice in the Gatecrasher's Paradox and claims that naked
statistical evidence is sufficient for a plaintiff to recover.
commentators have showed support for this sort of individualized tailoring of statistical evidence.
See Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 675 ("The problem is that the evidence in question does not deal
with each defendant's guilt individually.").
33. Williams, supra note 5, at 300-07.
34. Id.
35. See id.; see also LOGIC, PROBABILITY, AND PRESUMPTIONS IN LEGAL REASONING 628 (Scott
Brewer ed., 2011) (providing Jonathan Cohen's opinion on many of the responses to his
Gatecrasher's Paradox).
36. LOGIC, PROBABILITY, AND PRESUMPTIONS IN LEGAL REASONING, supra note 35, at 628;
Williams, supra note 5, at 300-07.
37. See Eggleston, supra note 5, at 679-83 (defending the Gatecrasher plaintiff, as the odds
are in the plaintiffs favor).
38. LOGIC, PROBABILITY, AND PRESUMPTIONS IN LEGAL REASONING, supra note 35, at 628.
39. See Eggleston, supra note 5, at 680-83.
[Vol. 68:5:14071414
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Ultimately, Williams and Eggleston both seek to resolve the
Gatecrasher's Paradox by appealing to one's innate sense of justice.40
For Williams, the Gatecrasher's Paradox produces an unjust result
when naked statistical evidence is insufficiently tied to an individual
defendant.41 Additionally, injustice exists in the absence of a damage-
apportionment scheme whereby a recovery reflects the plaintiffs
noticeably strained evidence. 42 Alternatively, Eggleston finds no
injustice in the Gatecrasher's Paradox, instead emphasizing that a just
result occurs when judgment is awarded to a plaintiff with the odds in
his favor.43
C. Addressing the Burden of Proof
Another44 approach to the Gatecrasher's Paradox does not seek
to provide an alternate perspective or analysis of its facts, but instead
reexamines the plaintiffs burden of proof and questions whether the
sole use of naked statistical evidence is adequate for the rodeo owner to
recover.45 Departing from the abstract, normative resolutions proposed
by Williams and Eggleston, Professor Edward Cheng recently
addressed the Gatecrasher's Paradox through a reconceptualization of
the burden of proof.4 6
40. See id. (arguing that the Gatecrasher's Paradox contains no offense to justice, as the
plaintiff has the odds in his favor); Williams, supra note 5, at 297 (discussing, ultimately, how
justice demands a new rule of evidence to waylay the concerns of naked statistical evidence); see
also LOGIC, PROBABILITY, AND PRESUMPTIONS IN LEGAL REASONING, supra note 35, at 628-31
(recounting both Williams's and Eggleston's arguments, noting their normative undercurrents).
41. Williams, supra note 5, at 297.
42. Id.
43. LOGIC, PROBABILITY, AND PRESUMPTIONS IN LEGAL REASONING, supra note 35, at 628-
31; Eggleston, supra note 5, at 680-83.
44. While this approach to the Gatecrasher's Paradox is the final response analyzed in this
Note, there have been many more responses to the Gatecrasher's Paradox than the three detailed
here. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 679-80; Cohen, supra note 14, at 396-98; David Enoch,
Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher, Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge,
30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 197, 200-02 (2012); Mike Redmayne, Exploring the Proof Paradoxes, 14
LEGAL THEORY 281, 285-300 (2008); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk,
Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73
IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1054 (1988). However, most of these responses fit roughly into the three
categories outlined above and, for the sake of efficiency, have not been fully discussed in the text.
45. See Cheng, supra note 5, at 1269-71 (approaching the Gatecrasher's Paradox using his
reconceptualized burden of prooo.
46. Id.; see LOGIC, PROBABILITY, AND PRESUMPTIONS IN LEGAL REASONING, supra note 35, at
628-31 (recounting the normative approaches to naked statistical evidence advanced by Williams
and Eggleston); Eggleston, supra note 5, at 680-83 (finding no affront to justice in the
Gatecrasher's Paradox); Williams, supra note 5, at 297 (using a normative rationale to advance a
new rule of evidence, one that would waylay the justice concerns in the Gatecrasher's Paradox).
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Cheng proposes an alternate way to view different burden-of-
proof standards, one that better reflects the mechanics of the trial
system.47 Specifically, Cheng asserts that, at their core, each of the proof
standards requires jurors to weigh competing narratives. Contrary to
traditional perceptions, the 'legal system does not ask decisionmakers
to determine whether litigants have established their cases to a
particular level of certainty. Instead, decisionmakers compare the
stories or theories put forward by the parties, and determine which
story is more compelling in light of the evidence." 48 This view of the
preponderance standard rejects the notion that preponderance
constitutes a probability threshold and instead presents it as a ratio
test that compares the probability of both the defendant's and plaintiffs
narrative.49
Employing a Bayesian lens, a resolution to the Gatecrasher's
Paradox may be achieved by applying Cheng's reconceptualized
preponderance standard:
Assuming that payment was in cash and no receipt was given, can the rodeo organizers
recover against a randomly selected audience member? Again, the raw probabilities under
the traditional preponderance standard suggest yes, since there is a 0.501 probability that
any randomly selected audience member is a gatecrasher. However, the reconceptualized
preponderance standard suggests otherwise . . . . [W]hether the audience member is a
lawful patron or a gatecrasher does not change the probability of observing the evidence
presented ... and plaintiff fails to satisfy his burden of proof.5 0
The likelihood of observing the naked statistical evidence-the 50.1%
chance that any randomly selected rodeo attendee is a trespasser-is
exactly the same regardless of whether a particular defendant is indeed
innocent or liable. Stated differently, jurors could equally expect to see
this probabilistic data in every Gatecrasher trial. Given this broad
applicability, the naked statistical evidence fails to make the plaintiffs
narrative more likely than the defendant's claims of innocence; without
more, the plaintiff fails to meet his burden. In this way, the
Gatecrasher's Paradox could reach a resolution by reworking the
problem with an insightful look at the preponderance standard.5 1
47. Cheng, supra note 5, at 1258.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1270-71.
51. See id. at 1258; Kaye, supra note 5, at 45-48 (detailing different avenues whereby the
apparent 50.1% chance of guilt can be seen as inaccurate); Williams, supra note 5, at 297




D. The New Perspective
Although the Gatecrasher's Paradox is approaching its fortieth
birthday, Cohen's question remains open.5 2 While the three approaches
discussed above hardly represent a comprehensive encyclopedia of the
vast literature on Cohen's hypothetical, they aptly reflect the
predominate state of the debate surrounding the problem.53
Kaye's response to the Gatecrasher's Paradox discounts the
value of naked statistical evidence and emphasizes an administrable
system whereby courts align incentives with judgments.54
Alternatively, Williams appeals to justice and proposes an entirely new
rule, one that requires a plaintiff to tailor probabilistic evidence
specifically to the defendant in question. 55 Cheng attacks the
Gatecrasher's Paradox, not by questioning the mechanics of the
problem, but by reconceptualizing the evidentiary standard that the
plaintiff must meet to receive a favorable judgment.56 There is merit in
all of these responses, but ultimately, an underlying issue that pervades
the Gatecrasher's Paradox remains untouched.57
As the scholarly conversation continues, this Note seeks to
provide a new perspective on the problem, a solution that may be
extrapolated to the use of naked statistical evidence in general. This
Note looks to the Constitution to resolve the Gatecrasher's Paradox.58
"The absurd injustice of [the Gatecrasher's Paradox] suffices to show
that there is something wrong somewhere. But where?"59 The answer
may lie in due process.
III. FACTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY AND DUE PROCESS
The Due Process Clause commands fundamental fairness in the
conduct of both civil and criminal trials. 60 While such a broad notion
52. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
53. While there have been many more responses to the Gatecrasher's Paradox than the three
detailed here, all of them roughly fit into the approaches outlined in the text. See, e.g., Brilmayer,
supra note 13, at 679-80; Cohen, supra note 14, at 396-98; Enoch et al., supra note 44; Redmayne,
supra note 44; Wright, supra note 44.
54. Allen, supra note 17, at 411-12; Kaye, supra note 5, at 45-48.
55. Williams, supra note 5, at 297.
56. Cheng, supra note 5, at 1270-71.
57. Cohen, supra note 14, at 395 ("Scholarly debate has [ultimately] failed to produce any
satisfactory responses [to Cohen's paradox].").
58. See Cheng, supra note 5, at 1270-71; Kaye, supra note 16, at 106; Williams, supra note
5, at 297.
59. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
60. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bros. v. Rundle, 302 F. Supp. 402, 403 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
("Due process commands fundamental fairness in the conduct of a trial.").
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naturally manifests itself in a multitude of practices-from
prosecutorial rules to courtroom procedure-it has recently been
broadened by certain appellate courts to target a new form of
fundamental impropriety: factually impossible, mutually exclusive
verdicts.61 This expansion of due process protection provides a new lens
under which the Gatecrasher's Paradox may be examined.
A. Mutually Exclusive Verdicts
Convicting two or more defendants of a single, "lone gunman"
crime constitutes a violation of due process. 62 Stated more generally,
the use of "inherently factually contradictory theories violates the
principles of due process."63
To illustrate this concept, consider Smith v. Groose, in which the
Eighth Circuit reversed a felony murder conviction against the
defendant Jon Smith.64 In Smith, the defendant and a group of friends
set out into a neighborhood on the evening of November 27, 1983,
looking for vacant houses to vandalize. 65 Eventually, the group came
upon the house of Pauline and Earl Chambers.66 They noticed that the
door to the Chambers' house was ajar and there were footprints leading
inside.67 As Smith and his friends neared the house, they crossed paths
with Michael Cunningham, an individual already in the process of
looting the Chambers' house.68 Cunningham agreed to allow Smith and
his group to continue the burglary with him.6 9
61. See Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000).
62. See id. (finding a due process violation where a prosecutor uses a factually impossible
theory for the case to secure mutually exclusive verdicts); 5 WHITE COLLAR CRIME § 38:34 (2d ed.)
("Some courts have held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause prevents
prosecutors from using different theories of the same facts in order to convict multiple defendants
allegedly involved in the same crime. However, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this
issue."). But see Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187-88 (2005) (noting that factually
inconsistent theories for immaterial issues do not raise due process concerns, but remanding to
determine whether a factual inconsistency at the core of a prosecutor's theory violates the Due
Process Clause); Stumpfv. Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 754 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (finding no due
process violation when prosecutors are merely drawing two separate inferences from the same
evidentiary record).
63. Smith, 205 F.3d at 1052.
64. Id. at 1054.







At this point, two opposing theories for the events of that night
emerge. 70 Anthony Lytle, a member of Smith's group and the
government's key witness in the subsequent trials, provided both
versions of the story. Lytle first told police that Smith and the rest of
his group entered the Chambers' house before the Chambers were
murdered.7 ' After hearing "sounds of pain" from the interior of the
house, Lytle entered the Chambers' residence to find a third member of
their group, James Bowman, stabbing the victims with a knife while
Smith stood by.72
This first account from Lytle contradicts a subsequent police
report and his later testimony at the Smith felony murder trial.73 In
these instances, Lytle reported that he confronted Cunningham before
Smith and Bowman entered the house. 74 During this altercation,
Cunningham allegedly told Lytle that he "took care of' the Chambers,
implying that Cunningham (not Bowman) was the murderer.75 Thus, if
this second account were true, the murder would have occurred well
before Smith and Bowman arrived at the crime scene. 76
While either of Lytle's statements is independently plausible,
they are mutually exclusive accounts of the night-the Chambers were
murdered either before or after Bowman entered the house.77 At the
Smith trial, the government used Lytle's first statement as the
foundation for its prosecutorial theory.78 Consistent with Lytle's first
account, the government argued that Bowman was the killer and Smith
was therefore guilty of felony murder.79 The jury agreed.80
Just months later, however, the State indicted Cunningham on
the countervailing theory. Relying instead on Lytle's later statements,
the government alternatively argued that Cunningham murdered the
victims before Smith and Bowman even entered the house.81 Despite
70. Of key importance, the mutually exclusive nature of these two theories led to the finding




74. Id. at 1047.
75. Id.
76. To clarify, according to this second theory for the case, Cunningham essentially told Lytle
that he murdered the Chambers before he began to loot their house. As such, it would be
impossible for Bowman to have murdered the couple-Cunningham already committed the crime
before Bowman arrived at the scene. See id.
77. Id. at 1052 ("As the State asserts, either Smith arrived before the murder or he arrived
after. . . .").
78. Id. at 1050-52.





the apparent mutual exclusivity of the government's theories for the
two cases, a separate jury also found Cunningham guilty.82
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit assessed "whether the Due
Process Clause forbids a state from using inconsistent, irreconcilable
theories to secure convictions against two or more defendants in
prosecutions for the same offenses arising out of the same event."83
Smith contended that the state's use of inconsistent theories to secure
mutually exclusive verdicts-that the Chambers were murdered both
before and after Smith entered the house-violated the Due Process
Clause as it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.84 Specifically,
fundamental unfairness permeated the trials when the government
presented mutually exclusive theories as truth in both, despite knowing
that one of the accounts must necessarily be false.8 5 Agreeing with this
argument, the court noted that "[t]he State's use of factually
contradictory theories in this case constituted 'foul blows,' error that
fatally infected Smith's conviction."8 6 In reversing the verdict of the trial
court, the Eighth Circuit held that a defendant's due process rights are
violated when a factual inconsistency exists at the "core" of a
prosecutor's case.8 7
The Smith case thus provides a touchstone example of how
convictions based on factually irreconcilable theories raise substantial
due process concerns.8 8 While the Supreme Court has found no due
process violation where this factual inconsistency solely impacts an
immaterial element of the case, it has not directly addressed Smith's
holding that factual inconsistency at the "core" of a prosecutor's case
violates the Due Process Clause.8 9 Thus, for a complete understanding
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1049.
84. Id. at 1051.
85. Id. This aspect of the decision-finding that a certainty of factual impossibility equates
to the presentation of false testimony despite no actual knowledge of which particular testimony
is false-will be of key importance to the analysis of the Gatecrasher's Paradox. See infra Part IV
(finding a due process violation where the Gatecrasher plaintiff achieves factually impossible
recovery in his favor).
86. Smith, 205 F.3d at 1051.
87. Id. at 1052.
88. See id. at 1051-52 (finding that the existence of factual impossibility constitutes
material, "foul blows" to a trial, rendering it fundamentally unfair and in violation of the Due
Process Clause).
89. The holding in Smith remains good law, as the Court has only addressed issues
tangentially related to "core" factual impossibility. See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187-
88 (2005) (finding that factually inconsistent theories for immaterial issues do not raise due
process concerns). But see Stumpfv. Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 754 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (finding




of how this rationale applies to the Gatecrasher's Paradox and naked
statistical evidence in general, the actual due process concerns
underlying Smith warrant close examination.
B. Constitutional Concerns
The Gatecrasher's Paradox presents a situation wherein a
plaintiff may be awarded comprehensive relief despite the existence of
factually inconsistent, mutually exclusive verdicts. 90 Per Smith, such
inconsistency raises constitutional concerns in the equivalent criminal
context because it renders trials invoking the irreconcilable theories
fundamentally unfair.91 This fundamental unfairness equates to a due
process violation.92
Fully grasping fundamental fairness is no simple task, however,
as the due process requirement often takes on an ethereal form, varying
from case to case. Yet, courts generally agree that fundamental
unfairness occurs when "there is a reasonable probability that the
verdict might have been different had the trial been properly
conducted." 93 Stated differently, a trial is rendered fundamentally
unfair if there is any reasonable likelihood that the outcome might have
been affected by a tainting element. 94
Professor Anne Poulin has applied this standard to prosecutorial
inconsistency, detailing why the simultaneous use of irreconcilable
theories is fundamentally unfair.95 Poulin argues that advancing
mutually exclusive theories in separate trials is largely analogous to
presenting false testimony.96 She notes:
When the prosecution takes inconsistent positions in separate proceedings, absent an
explanation, only one of them can be correct. In one of the cases, then, the prosecution has
advanced a false impression. In some cases, the prosecution rests its position on such
inconsistent testimony that the case may fit conventional false testimony analysis. In
other cases, false testimony is not involved. Rather, the inconsistency flows from changes
in testimony or from the spin placed on the facts by the prosecutors. Nevertheless, the
prosecution's creation of a false impression should entitle the defendant to due process
relief.9 7
90. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
91. Smith, 205 F.3d at 1052.
92. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.").
93. Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1985).
94. Poulin, supra note 9, at 1465.
95. Id. at 1460.
96. Id. at 1461.
97. Id. at 1464-65.
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Thus, a prosecutor's ability to take irreconcilable positions in
separate proceedings closely parallels the presentation of false
testimony: there exists a certainty that, in at least one of the trials, the
prosecution advanced a false impression. As illustrated by Smith, these
false impressions are very likely to have a material impact on jury
deliberations. When they do, a trial is rendered fundamentally unfair,
thereby violating the Due Process Clause.
But while scholars have recognized that prosecutorial
inconsistency raises material due process concerns, few have
expounded on the constitutional concerns associated with equivalent
inconsistency in civil trials. Does the same underlying logic that
establishes a due process violation in a criminal trial carry equal force
in a civil trial? One might argue that while due process may help shield
criminal defendants from conviction, it does not equally extend to a civil
defendant who merely faces monetary or equitable remedies.98
Ultimately, though, the due process concerns are equally
applicable in civil proceedings.99 As detailed above, prosecutorial
inconsistency renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair, thus
running afoul of the Due Process Clause.100 However, the Due Process
Clause requires fundamental fairness in both criminal and civil
proceedings. 101 Justice Brennan echoed this notion by noting, "So basic
to our jurisprudence is the right to a fair trial that it has been called
'the most fundamental of all freedoms.' "102 In this way, the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly denotes-impartial to either criminal or civil
proceedings-that neither a defendant's life, liberty, nor property may
be deprived without the due process of law. 103 As such, the right to a
98. Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 2-3
(2006) (drawing a distinction between civil and criminal due process).
99. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 586 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting
the civil defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial).
100. See, e.g., Smith, 205 F.3d at 1051; Poulin, supra note 9, at 1461-65.
101. Latiolais v. Whitley, 93 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1996); see Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d
354, 357 (7th Cir. 1993) ("There is a constitutional right to a fair trial in a civil case."); see also Eric
D. Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, Contesting Government's Financial Interest in Drug Cases, 13
CRIM. JUST. 4,4-5 (1999) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 532 (1927)) ('The constitutional
due process guarantee includes the right to an impartial tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.");
George Clemon Freeman, Jr. & Kyle E. McSlarrow, RICO and the Due Process 'Void for
Vagueness" Test, 45 BUS. LAW. 1003, 1007 n.25 (1990) ("The language of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment does not distinguish between civil and criminal contexts, stating that no
person shall 'be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' U.S. Const.
amend. V., Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment likewise makes no such distinction: 'nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' "); Dana
Walsh, The Dangers of Eyewitness Identification: A Call for Greater State Involvement to Ensure
Fundamental Fairness, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1415, 1453 (2013).
102. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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fundamentally fair trial is equally applicable in a civil trial as it is in a
criminal context. 104 "[Flairness in a jury trial, whether criminal or civil
in nature, is a vital constitutional right."105
Taken as a whole, then, a plaintiff who simultaneously advances
irreconcilable theories in multiple cases is certain to present a false
impression in at least one of the trials. This false impression is highly
analogous to the presentation of false testimony, and when material,
renders the trials fundamentally unfair. As with criminal trials, civil
trials demand fundamental fairness. Thus, the plaintiff will be unable
to recover, as the false impressions and subsequent fundamental
unfairness result in a due process violation.
IV. THE GATECRASHER'S PARADOX UNDER THE LENS OF DUE PROCESS
The discomfort surrounding the Gatecrasher's Paradox is not
difficult to define.106 In Cohen's problem, the plaintiff solely employs
naked statistical evidence-by which every defendant has a 50.1%
chance of being a gatecrasher-to theoretically secure a verdict against
any of the would-be defendants.107 However, as Cohen himself notes,
this simply cannot be.' 08 In fact, only 501 of the rodeo attendees failed
to purchase a ticket. 09 Nonetheless, the plaintiff, armed solely with
naked statistical evidence, "might conceivably be entitled, to recover
1,000 admission-moneys, when it was admitted that 499 had actually
been paid.""10 In this inconsistency one finds injustice, but in this
inconsistency one also discovers a solution.
Given its potential for mutually exclusive verdicts, the
Gatecrasher's Paradox is ripe for examination under the lens of due
process. While commentators have sought to resolve the problem from
numerous angles,"' the constitutional concerns raised by the plaintiffs
would-be lawsuits have been left untouched. However, given the
coexistence of the plaintiffs factually irreconcilable theories of the case
and the potential for mutually exclusive judgments, an analysis of the
due process concerns raised by the problem is warranted.
104. See Latiolais, 93 F.3d at 207 (reaffirming a civil defendant's constitutional right to a
fundamentally fair trial).
105. Bailey v. Sys. Innovation, Inc., 852 F.2d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 1988).
106. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75. (admitting that the plaintiffs ability to recover from all





111. See supra Part II.
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A. A New Perspective on an Old Problem
If the Gatecrasher plaintiff brought suit against and recovered
from 502 rodeo attendees, there would surely be a due process violation
because the plaintiff knew that at least one of those defendants legally
purchased a ticket to the rodeo. 112 Viewed in the aggregate, the plaintiff
has presented a factual impossibility as truth: he advanced naked
statistical evidence to argue that 502 defendants were more-likely-
than-not gatecrashers despite knowing with certainty the evidence did
not back that claim in at least one trial. 113 The plaintiffs continued
ability to proffer this false impression, despite the aggregate certainty
of factual impossibility, renders the trials fundamentally unfair, thus
violating the defendants' due process rights. 114
Once the 502nd defendant has been found liable, the underlying
mechanics of the Gatecrasher's Paradox are analogous to the rationale
in Smith.115 There, the simultaneous conviction of both Bowman and
Cunningham constituted a factual impossibility rising to the level of a
due process violation. 116 Similarly, holding 502 defendants liable as
gatecrashers would constitute an equivalent factual impossibility, and
should equally raise due process concerns given the eventual certainty
of a false impression that contributes to the trials' fundamental
unfairness.
Such a response, however, hardly provides a complete answer to
Cohen's problem. Should the first 501 defendants merely bemoan their
luck as members of the unfortunate majority who were tried within the
realm of factual possibility, while the 502nd defendant and his
subsequent companions cheer the availability of their newly available
due process defense? The response is clearly no-all 1,000 defendants
are faced with the same naked statistical evidence, and as such, all
1,000 defendants should be equally punished or exonerated. When then
should due process concerns be addressed?
112. See Latiolais v. Whitley, 93 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1996) (reaffirming a civil defendant's
constitutional right to a fundamentally fair trial); cf. Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (8th
Cir. 2000) (finding, in the equivalent criminal context, that factual impossibility renders a trial
fundamentally unfair and afoul of the Due Process Clause).
113. This notion relies on the "aggregation" theory discussed above. See Poulin, supra note 9,
at 1465; supra text accompanying note 9.
114. See Smith, 205 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting the ability to present evidence tainted by factual
impossibility constitutes "foul blows," rendering a trial fundamentally unfair).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 1051-52 ("As the State asserts, either Smith arrived before the murder or he
arrived after. . . .").
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B. Improbability and Impossibility
One first might propose an analysis of each individual lawsuit.
Beyond the absolute assurance of a due process violation that occurs
when a judgment is rendered against the 502nd defendant, there is a
strong possibility that an innocent rodeo attendee will be found liable
much earlier in the litigation process. As indicated by the problem,
there is a 49.9% chance that a given defendant is innocent and indeed
purchased a ticket to the venue.117 Thus p represents the probability
that in a given trial, an innocent defendant will nonetheless be found
liable as a gatecrasher. If this is true, the probability of holding no
innocent defendants liable at N number of independent trials is (1- p)N.
Arriving at our desired equation, the probability of holding at least one
innocent defendant liable in N number of independent trials is 1 - (1 -
p)N. Given a certainty level of .99, the application of this formula shows
that at least one innocent defendant is likely to be found liable by only
the seventh trial. Figure 1 below details these results:
Figure 1
Number of Chance of Holding an









Thus, by merely the seventh independent trial wherein the Gatecrasher
plaintiff solely uses naked statistical evidence to secure a judgment
against the defendant, there is a near certainty that one of the seven
defendants was an innocent, paying rodeo attendee. Intuitively, this
result is unsurprising. The statistics derived from the Gatecrasher's
Paradox provide a near-even likelihood that any randomly selected
rodeo attendee is either innocent or liable. Thus, asserting that no
innocent rodeo attendee will be found liable by the 501st trial is
practically equivalent to arguing that a coin will land heads up 501 flips
117. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
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in a.row: essentially impossible. Indeed, by about the seventh flip, it is
nearly certain that the coin will have landed tails up at least once.
Likewise, by about the seventh trial, it is nearly certain that an
innocent rodeo attendee will have been found liable. Given these high
probabilities of error, the due process defense might apply much earlier
in the progression of trials.118
This rationale, however, suffers from two distinct
disadvantages. First, until the 502nd defendant is found liable, there is
only a strong factual improbability-not an absolute impossibility-
that an innocent rodeo attendee has not been found liable. 19 As such,
the applicability of the Smith rationale and its propensity to find due
process violations where mutually exclusive verdicts occur rests on the
level of deference that courts afford to a given certainty level. 120 While
some judges may find factual improbability equivalent to factual
impossibility at a certain threshold (seven trials or otherwise), others
may require certainty of factual impossibility (through 502 defendants
being found liable). A second disadvantage revisits an earlier complaint:
while the above analysis brings potential justice to defendants seven
through 501, are not the first six defendants equally entitled to
protection under the Due Process Clause?
C. Core Inconsistencies
An alternative approach better handles the issue. Recall that in
the Gatecrasher's Paradox, the same naked statistical evidence could
be used to convict each defendant. 121 In other words, each defendant has
a 50.1% chance of being a "gatecrasher," which is sufficient to impose
liability on any defendant under a traditional view of the preponderance
standard.1 22 Therefore, the evidence that would be used to hold the
502nd defendant liable would be identical to the evidence used to
impose liability on the first, second, and "nth" defendants.
118. Cf. Smith, 205 F.3d at 1051-52 (finding a due process violation where a certainty of
factual impossibility exists).
119. Returning to Figure 1, as the number of independent trials increases, so too does the
probability that an innocent, paying rodeo attendee has errantly been found liable. Indeed, while
Figure 1 shows this statistic through the first eight trials, the probability of the existence of an
errant trial continues to approach p=1.0. After the 501st trial, the probability that the Gatecrasher
plaintiff has randomly selected only liable parties to bring suit against is minuscule-p = 4.15624
x 10-151. However, from an excessively technical standpoint, there is not an absolute certainty of
error until the 502nd trial.
120. Smith, 205 F.3d at 1051-52.
121. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
122. See Cheng, supra note 5, at 1259 ("Conventional legal thinking equates the
preponderance standard in civil litigation with a requirement that the plaintiff prove her case to
a probability greater than 0.5.").
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Given the above, this Note argues that due process violations
take a second form: if the same naked statistical evidence could be used
to convict any randomly selected member of a population, and the
simultaneous conviction of the entire population would constitute a due
process violation 23 (due to the mutually exclusive nature of the crime),
then the conviction of even one of those individuals constitutes a due
process violation.
Applying this rule to the Gatecrasher's Paradox, the conviction
of even one defendant would violate due process. The Gatecrasher
plaintiff is armed with the same naked probabilities in every trial. But
as detailed above, the potential for 1,000 mutually exclusive verdicts
renders each trial fundamentally unfair.124 When the defendant in the
first trial is found liable based on evidence that could equally and
arbitrarily apply to any of the 999 other rodeo attendees, the plaintiff
has violated the defendant's due process rights. 125 While the 50.1%
chance that a particular defendant is a gatecrasher is not inherently
dishonest or inaccurate, its extrapolated effect is. On a larger scale, the
naked statistical evidence used by the plaintiff suggests that each
defendant is liable for failing to purchase a ticket, which is certainly
false. This perspective mirrors the mechanics of Smith, where the
prosecutor suggested that each defendant was guilty of murder, despite
the apparent factual impossibility of that claim. 126
The due process concerns highlighted by this Note, however,
reach beyond the rationale presented in Smith. In Smith, there would
have been no due process violation if the prosecutor solely chose one
theory for the case. 127 The prosecutor only violated the defendants' due
process rights when he simultaneously advanced mutually exclusive
theories. 128 In contrast, this Note argues that the plaintiff in the
Gatecrasher's Paradox violates the first defendant's due process rights.
This distinction, however, is not difficult to reconcile. In Smith, there
was no factual impossibility in the first trial. 129 The prosecutor's
original theory-that Bowman killed the Chambers as Smith and
123. Mirroring the logic found in Smith, 205 F.3d at 1045-52.
124. Cf. Smith, 205 F.3d at 1051-52 (finding a due process violation in the equivalent criminal
context).
125. See id. at 1052 (holding that presentation of factually impossible theories to secure
mutually exclusive verdicts constitutes a violation of due process); Poulin, supra note 9, at 146 1-
65 (suggesting that, even if a prosecutor does not specifically know when he is advancing false
evidence, the existence of factual impossibility in the aggregate transforms the presentation of
mutually exclusive theories into the presentation of false testimony).
126. Smith, 205 F.3d at 1050-51.
127. Id. at 1048-51.
128. Id. at 1050-52.
129. See id. at 1048-51.
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Cunningham stood by-is a perfectly plausible description of the
crime. 130 The prosecutor only created factual impossibility at the second
trial, Cunningham's trial, during which he claimed the Chambers were
instead murdered before Bowman even entered the house. 131
Alternatively, the first trial in the Gatecrasher's Paradox is
premised on factual impossibility. The plaintiffs sole use of naked
statistical evidence does not provide a coherent, factually plausible
theory of the case. Unlike Smith, where the application of the
prosecutor's original theory to each potential defendant provides a
perfectly reasonable narrative,1 32 the application of the Gatecrasher
plaintiffs original theory would result in 1,000 mutually exclusive
verdicts in the plaintiffs favor. 133 Given this immediate potential for
factual impossibility, due process is violated in the very first trial in the
Gatecrasher's Paradox.
V. THE RANGE OF THE DUE PROCESS DEFENSE
A. The Prison Guard Hypothetical: Where to Draw the Line?
While examining the Gatecrasher's Paradox under the lens of
due process provides a new perspective on Cohen's time-honored
problem, this Note's proposal is not without its limitations. For
instance, opponents may question whether the same due process
concerns espoused earlier should remain viable if only one of the rodeo
attendees purchased a ticket to the venue, leaving 999 gatecrashers.1 34
Pursuant to the naked statistical evidence produced by such a set of
facts, each individual would have a 99.9% chance of being a gatecrasher.
Should the above analysis deny the plaintiff relief, despite the
overwhelming possibility that any randomly selected member of the
population is a gatecrasher? As Neil Cohen notes, "[I]t is unlikely that
our sense of justice would require us to deny judgment to the proprietor
because there were no facts other than those overwhelming numbers
that tended to show that an individual defendant was one of the 999,
and not the one honest customer."135
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. In this instance, Bowman would likely be charged with murder, while Cunningham and
Smith would face felony murder charges. See id.
133. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.





The answer to this conundrum lies in where one draws a line of
demarcation, a line that transforms probabilistic evidence from
quantities that carry the blemish of injustice to statistics that no longer
raise material concerns. Such an inquiry into the precise line best
suited for our judicial system is beyond the scope of this Note, as the
literature itself regarding when naked statistical evidence undergoes
this "phase change" is only in its infancy.136 However, to help visualize
this abstract discussion, consider Professor Charles Nesson's prison
guard hypothetical:
In an enclosed yard are twenty-five identically dressed prisoners and a prison guard. The
sole witness is too far away to distinguish individual features. He sees the guard,
recognizable by his uniform, trip and fall, apparently knocking himself out. The prisoners
huddle and argue. One breaks away from the others and goes to a shed in the corner of
the yard to hide. The other twenty-four set upon the fallen guard and kill him. After the
killing, the hidden prisoner emerges from the shed and mixes with the other prisoners.
When the authorities later enter the yard, they find the dead guard and the twenty-five
prisoners. Given these facts, twenty-four of the twenty-five are guilty of murder. 13 7
From a purely statistical standpoint, Professor Nesson's hypothetical
largely emulates the Gatecrasher's Paradox-although here, there is a
96% chance that any randomly selected prisoner participated in the
murder.1 38 The only significant differences between Nesson's and
Cohen's illustrations of naked statistical evidence are the nature of the
trial (the prison riot problem necessarily invokes a criminal proceeding)
and the statistical chance of guilt. 13 9 To this latter point, Nesson's
hypothetical likely used a 96% chance of guilt because this probability
lies just beyond the traditional perception of the reasonable doubt
standard (p > .95).140 Thus, in totality, Nesson's Prison Riot problem is
the criminal counterpart to the civil dispute in Cohen's Gatecrasher's
Paradox.
If a prosecutor, relying solely on naked statistical evidence,
brings murder charges against the prisoners, this Note suggests that
each defendant could raise a due process defense. The same statistical
evidence used against the very first defendant (the 96% chance that the
defendant was involved in the assault) could equally apply to any of the
136. See Edward K. Cheng & G. Alexander Nunn, DNA, Blue Bus, and Phase Changes 3-6
(August 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (providing a statistical formula to
determine when DNA evidence-a form of naked statistical evidence-may be validly considered
an independent support for a verdict).
137. Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of
Complexity, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1187, 1192-93 (1979).
138. Id.
139. Id.; cf. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("If quantified,
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard might be in the range of 95% probable.").
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other twenty-four prisoners. However, the simultaneous conviction of
all twenty-five prisoners would constitute a factual impossibility
because one of those prisoners was hiding in the shed during the attack.
As such, the use of naked statistical evidence against even one of the
prisoners should constitute a due process violation. At the very "core"
of the prosecutor's case is the potential for factual impossibility; as per
the analysis above, allowing a prosecutor to advance this evidence
despite the certainty of a false impression renders each trial
fundamentally unfair. 14 1
Thus, from a technical standpoint, the increased probability of
guilt does not negate the existence of a due process violation. But from
the normative angle discussed above, should the higher chance of guilt
diminish potential due process concerns? Such an inquiry requires a
fact-specific response, as a number of factors impact this determination.
For example, the nature of the underlying crime and the potential
penalties may affect whether the sense of injustice derived from the
Gatecrasher's Paradox transfers to a different setting. However, in
areas of criminal law analogous to the Prison Riot hypothetical,
convictions with similar potential-of-innocence percentages have
sparked outrage, suggesting that a mere 4% chance of innocence does
not diminish the applicability of the due process defense. 142 Perhaps, in
some circumstances, naked statistical evidence could produce a
percentage of guilt so high that these concerns dissipate. 143 But for the
vast majority of naked statistical evidence-even bare probabilities
that infer a 96% chance of guilt-due process concerns retain their
significance.
141. Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000).
142. A recent study suggests that at least 4.1% of defendants sentenced to death in the
modern era are innocent. Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants
Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 7230,
7234 (2014). When confronted with this statistic, a large portion of the general public, including
University of Michigan law professor Samuel Gross, found the figure "disturbing." Ed Pilkington,
US death row study: 4% of defendants sentenced to die are innocent, GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/28/death-penalty-study-4-percent-defendants-
innocent [http://perma.cc/N9DY-5FRH]. While false convictions in death penalty cases obviously
invoke much stronger emotions than responses to cases where defendants are improperly found
liable of trespassing, the reaction provides insight for Nesson's Prison Riot hypothetical, where the
twenty-four murders may face severe penalties (including death). Thus, there exists some support
for the notion that Due Process violations associated with naked statistical evidence should remain
viable even in the face of higher guilt probabilities.
143. For example, as Neil Cohen suggests, perhaps a 99.9% chance of guilt would dissipate
any inherent injustice within the Gatecrasher's Paradox. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 396. Again,
however, pinpointing the precise limit of the due process defense is beyond the scope of this Note,
and is instead left as an open question.
[Vol. 68:5:14071430
NAKED STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
B. The Blue Bus Problem: Highlighting the Contours of
the Due Process Defense
The Gatecrasher's Paradox is often discussed in conjunction
with other hypotheticals that contemplate the proper place of naked
statistical evidence in our legal system. Along with Nesson's Prison Riot
hypothetical, Cohen's paradox runs parallel to a third legal puzzle: the
Blue Bus problem. 1 4 4 A variation of Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc.,'145 the
Blue Bus problem highlights the contours of this Note's solution. The
problem proceeds as follows:
While driving late at night on a dark, two-lane road, a person confronts an oncoming bus
speeding down the center line of the road in the opposite direction. In the glare of the
headlights, the person sees that the vehicle is a bus, but he cannot otherwise identify it.
He swerves to avoid a collision, and his car hits a tree. The bus speeds past without
stopping. The injured person later sues the Blue Bus Company. He proves, in addition to
the facts stated above, that the Blue Bus Company owns and operates 80% of the buses
that run on the road where the accident occurred. Can he win?1 46
The Blue Bus problem presents naked statistical evidence in a
manner divergent from the probabilities presented in the Gatecrasher's
Paradox, a manner that will highlight the scope and reach of the due
process defense to bare probabilities. On the surface, the Gatecrasher's
Paradox and the Blue Bus problem seem similar-Cohen's problem
presents defendants with a 50.1% chance of liability while the Blue Bus
problem provides a defendant with an 80% chance of liability. 147 Both
of these probabilities are presumably sufficient to satisfy the
preponderance standard. 148
Yet, despite these apparent similarities, the due process analysis
proposed by this Note is incompatible with the Blue Bus problem. Recall
that the due process violation in the Gatecrasher's Paradox was driven
by the factual impossibility at the core of the plaintiffs theory for the
case; the extrapolated effect of his sole use of naked statistical evidence
results in 1,000 rodeo attendees being found liable for a crime
committed by only 501 gatecrashers.1 4 9
In the Blue Bus problem, however, this factual impossibility is
missing. The naked statistical evidence derived from the Blue Bus
144. See, e.g., Fienberg, supra note 5, at 697.
145. 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).
146. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378-79 (1985).
147. Id.; cf. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
148. See Cheng, supra note 5, at 1259 ("Conventional legal thinking equates the
preponderance standard in civil litigation with a requirement that the plaintiff prove her case to
a probability greater than 0.5.").
149. See supra Part IV.
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problem is based on the frequency of buses traveling on the road, not
the probability of guilt based on a set population.1 50 Even if there were
multiple Blue Bus trials, there would always remain a (perhaps minute)
possibility that no error has occurred. Stated differently, if there were
a second, third, or 1,000th trial, the probability of the Blue Bus
Company's guilt remains a constant 80% throughout each-there is no
point where an erroneous verdict is certain.151
In contrast, such certainty is inevitable in the Gatecrasher's
Paradox.152 Given the set population of 1,000 rodeo attendees, factual
impossibility can be found at the core of the plaintiffs theory for the
case, and is assured with a verdict against the 502nd defendant. Indeed,
assessing a 50.1% chance of liability on each of the defendants would
presumably result in 1,000 mutually exclusive verdicts in favor the
plaintiff, 499 of which are necessarily erroneous. 153 As noted above,
however, assessing liability on the Blue Bus Company for 1,000
accidents would lack the same element of mutual exclusivity. Given
that the Blue Bus Company operated 80% of the buses on the road, it is
possible that the company was indeed the liable party in each of the
trials. The due process defense would therefore be unavailable absent a
court willing to equate a high degree of improbability with absolute
impossibility.
In this way, the Blue Bus problem highlights the contours of the
due process defense to naked statistical evidence. For naked statistical
evidence to render a trial fundamentally unfair, there must be an
element of factual impossibility at the core of a plaintiffs or prosecutor's
theory for the case. 154 In the Gatecrasher's Paradox, this element is
readily seen. 55 However, the Blue Bus problem invokes naked
statistical evidence of a different kind: evidence based on an
unchanging probability of liability derived from the frequency of busses
on the road.15 6 As such, there is no set population by which factual
impossibility can be ensured, and the due process defense that defeats
the Gatecrasher plaintiff is unavailable to the Blue Bus Company.
150. That is, there is not a set population by which factual impossibility can be ensured. See
Nesson, supra note 146, at 1378-79.
151. To be sure, as the number of independent trials solely invoking this naked statistical
evidence increases, the probability that the Blue Bus Company has been wrongfully found liable
increases to a material figure, but there will never exist an absolute certainty that a mistake has
been made. Such a move would be equivalent to the potential solution to the Gatecrasher's Paradox
dismissed above. See supra Section IV.A.
152. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
153. Id.
154. Cf. Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000).
155. COHEN, supra note 3, at 74-75.
156. Nesson, supra note 146, at 1378-79.
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Thus, a set population is essential to the viability of the due process
defense. 157
VI. CONCLUSION
After four decades of discussion, the scholarly debate
surrounding the Gatecrasher's Paradox is as strong as ever. Scholars
have resolved Cohen's problem from a number of different angles: by
discounting the objective probabilities and emphasizing the need to
incentivize plaintiffs or prosecutors to provide the best evidence
available; by requiring a plaintiff or prosecutor to tailor the available
evidence to the defendant on the stand; and by reconceptualizing a
plaintiffs or prosecutor's burden of proof. Despite these meritorious
responses, the conversation continues-and one key issue that pervades
the Gatecrasher's Paradox has been left untouched.
Analyzing the Gatecrasher's Paradox under the lens of due
process gives a new perspective on the problem. The constitutional
analysis of Cohen's problem changes materially once one recognizes
that a plaintiffs or prosecutor's ability to proffer factually irreconcilable
theories leading to mutually exclusive verdicts constitutes a due process
violation.
Once the 502nd defendant is found liable as a gatecrasher, a due
process violation is certain-at least one innocent rodeo attendee has
been found liable. But, if the same naked statistical evidence could be
used to convict any randomly selected member of a population, and the
conviction of the entire population would constitute a due process
violation, then there is no concrete barrier between recovery within the
realm of the plausible and the realm of the impossible. Given this
assertion, holding even one defendant liable with such evidence should
equally constitute a due process violation.
G. Alexander Nunn*
157. Practically speaking, a definite list of "cold hits" from a DNA database may provide just
such a set population.
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